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Comment
The Double Jeopardy Clause and Mistrials Granted
on Defendant's Motion: What Kind of Prosecutorial
Misconduct Precludes Reprosecution?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides that no
person shall "be subject to the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb."' This constitutional proscription has been described as
"one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization,"2 with roots
traceable to early Greek, Roman, and Canon Law.8 Application of this
seemingly straightforward command has, however, often proved to be
a most difficult task for the judiciary, and the principle has perhaps
engendered more confusion and uncertainty than any other constitutional provision.4
Although the protection originally afforded by the double jeopardy
clause was narrowly circumscribed, 5 judicial interpretation has resulted in considerable expansion of the principle's safeguards. Leading
cases have established that the proscription against double jeopardy is

1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The prohibition against double jeopardy applies not only to
felonies but also to misdemeanors. J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 20 (1969). The primary
purpose served by the rule is analogous to that served by the doctrines of res judicata

and collateral estoppel- to preserve the finality of judgments. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S.
28, 33 (1978). See also Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1960).

2. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
3. Id.at 151-55 (Black, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d
868, 870-71 (2d Cir. 1973), affd, 420 U.S. 358 (1975). In Jenkins, Judge Friendly observed
that "the draftsmen of the Bill of Rights intended to import into the Constitution the
Common Law protections much as they were described by Blackstone." Id.at 873.
4. In fashioning applicable standards in this area, courts have often created distinctions that border on the imperceptible, and the area is replete 'with subtle anomalies. See
generally Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 449 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Schulhofer], in which the author notes that "the complexity of the competing interests and the infinite variety of circumstances in which they arise have continued to impede formulation of a standard whose application can be at once satisfying and predictable." Id. at 451.
5. See Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 452-55. See also Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 201-02 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (debates by framers of fifth amendment provide little indication of the intended scope of double jeopardy protection).
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not only designed to provide protection against multiple prosecutions'
and punishment for the same offense,' but is also intended in certain
instances to preclude retrial if the original prosecution ends in mistrial.' This prohibition against reprosecution represents a constitutional policy of finality in criminal proceedings' and seeks to reduce the
occasions on which criminal defendants may be made to "run the
gauntlet twice."10
One particularly troublesome aspect of the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy emerges when a trial court declares a mistrial
on the motion of the defendant. The ordinary approach in such instances has been to permit reprosecution, even if the defendant's mistrial motion was necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error."
Justification of this permissive attitude toward reprosecution is
premised upon the defendant's control of the situation: in the absence
of a sua sponte mistrial declaration by the trial court, the defendant
has primary command over the course to be followed in the event of
error and may choose to retain the first jury and perhaps obtain an acquittal." As a general rule, then, a defendant's mistrial request
6. Situations that implicate the policy against multiple prosecutions include: (a)
reprosecution after a final verdict is reached in a previous trial; (b) reprosecution after the
first trial ends without a verdict; (c) successive prosecutions by different jurisdictions; (d)
governmental appeal from a trial court's decision in the defendant's favor. See Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 620, 373 A.2d 90, 98 (1977) (plurality opinion). See also
Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
7. See Note, Twice In Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 266, n.13 (1965) (it is clear that
preventing multiple punishment for the same offense was foremost in the minds of the
framers of the double jeopardy clause). The Supreme Court has indicated that multiple
punishment for the same offense at a single trial is forbidden by the double jeopardy
clause. See Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874), in which the Court stated that
"the Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished
for the same offense as from being twice tried." Id at 173.
8. In Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 619, 373 A.2d 90, 98 (1977) (plurality opinion), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that "[t]he leading cases construing the double jeopardy clause have emphasized that its purpose is to prevent the retrial itself, not
merely conviction and punishment." See also United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669
(1896) (the prohibition is not against twice being punished, but against twice being put in
jeopardy).
9. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971).
10. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 373 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
11. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971); United States v. Kessler, 530
F.2d 1246, 1255 (5th Cir. 1976).
12. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1971). See also United States v.
Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1976); United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135, 138 (8th Cir.
1977); Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 639, 373 A.2d 90, 108 (1977) (plurality opinion). This situation has been contrasted with that which arises when the trial court
declares the mistrial sua sponte, thereby depriving the defendant of his valued right to
have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.
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removes any constitutional barrier to retrial,18 since a retrial is necessary to protect the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in
just judgments." By voluntarily requesting a mistrial declaration, the
defendant may be said to have waived his constitutional rights against
15
twice being placed in jeopardy.
Although the general rule does implement a policy of waiver when a
mistrial is granted on the defendant's motion, reprosecution may
nevertheless be precluded when the defendant's request for a mistrial
is attributable to governmental overreaching." However, no United
States Supreme Court decision has actually barred reprosecution
following a successful defense motion for mistrial because of governmental misconduct, and therefore the type of misconduct embraced by
13. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971) (where circumstances develop not
attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion by the defendant for
mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error). Accord United States v.
Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976); United States v. Wilson, 534 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1976); United
States v. DiSilvio, 520 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1975).
14. United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246, 1255 (5th Cir. 1976). See Illinois v.
Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 470 (1973); Wade v. Hunter, 334 U.S. 684, 689 (1949). See also
note 28 infra.
15. See Comment, Double Jeopardy and Reprosecution After Mistriak Is the
Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary? 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 887, 889 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary] (author suggests that if mistrial is declared upon motion by the defendant, retrial presents no greater
problem than retrial after appeal). See also Leigh v. United States, 329 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir.
1964) (a defendant cannot plead former jeopardy when the jury before whom he was first
on trial was discharged on his own motion or with his consent); United States v. Burrell,
324 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963) (defendant cannot successfully plead the bar of double jeopardy
when mistrial was granted on his own motion and with his express consent); Roberts v.
United States, 348 F. Supp. 563, 567 (E.D. Mo. 1972) (double jeopardy claim waived solely
because all defendants made motion for mistrial). But see Comment, Retrial After
MistriaL The Double Jeopardy Doctrine of Manifest Necessity, 45 Miss. L.J. 1272, 1278
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Retrial After Mistrial] ("it is difficult to believe that the
substantive rights of defendants may be determined by which attorney first gains the attention of the trial judge to move for mistrial").
16. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 n.12 (1971) (where a defendant's mistrial
motion is necessitated by judicial or prosecutorial impropriety designed to avoid an acquittal, reprosecution might well be barred). See United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183,
1188 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974). See also United States v. Kessler,
530 F.2d 1246, 1255 (5th Cir. 1976) (the mere fact that the defendant has requested a
mistrial should not be controlling); Note, Double Jeopardy-MistrialGranted Upon Motion by Defendant-Standard for Reprosecution, 42 Mo. L. REV. 485, 490 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Standardfor Reprosecution];Comment, The Double JeopardyDilemma:
Reprosecution After Mistrial on Defendant's Motion, 63 IowA L. REV. 975 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as The Double Jeopardy Dilemma].
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the term overreaching remains an open question. As a result, a
dichotomy in views has emerged concerning the kind of misconduct
that will subordinate the public interest in convicting those guilty of
crimes to the defendant's right to be free from the mental and physical
anxiety associated with a second trial." Both state and federal courts
apparently agree that the double jeopardy clause bars reprosecution
when the first proceeding has been aborted at the defendant's request
because of intentional misconduct by the prosecution designed to provoke a mistrial request or to avoid an acquittal.18 Several courts have
recently suggested, however, that the prosecution should be held to a
stricter standard of conduct, and reprosecution precluded even in the
absence of such egregious prosecutorial activity.
This comment will analyze the delicate problems raised by the permissibility of reprosecution where prosecutorial misconduct has been
the basis of a successful defense motion for mistrial. Initially, this comment will examine the historical development of double jeopardy protection and the significance and implications of the important United
States Supreme Court decisions which have considered in general the
constitutional permissibility of retrial following mistrial. Thereafter,
those decisions which have suggested that the prosecution should be
held to a higher standard of conduct will be discussed, and the Pennsylvania experience analyzed as an illustration of the problems and
uncertainty confronted by courts that have attempted to resolve the
issue. Finally, this comment will suggest an appropriate resolution of
the conflicting interests at stake.

17. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). In Green, Justice Black concisely
articulated the fundamental underpinnings of the double jeopardy clause as follows:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, is that the state with all its resources and power should
not be able to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Since Green, courts have consistently seized upon this influential passage for guidance in
determining whether to subject the defendant to a second prosecution.
18. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Warfield, 424 Pa. 555, 227 A.2d 177 (1967) (where
district attorney openly acknowledged that he had deliberately caused mistrial in first
degree murder case, and mistrial was not caused by any act of the defendant, jeopardy attached and reprosecution was barred). Aside from WarfieK however, there is a
noticeable absence of case law in which a court has barred retrial because of the existence
of intentional misconduct by the prosecution. See also Standardfor Reprosecution, supra
note 16, at 490 (the few cases in which the conduct of the prosecution has been held to bar
reprosecution seem to indicate that the prosecutor's intent to precipitate a mistrial must
be obvious).
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Comment
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION

At early common law jeopardy did not attach until a final verdict
was rendered."9 The English system preserves this common law rule of
finality and thus avoids the difficulties of reprosecution after mistrial.M
In the United States, however, a rule quite different from that applied
under the English common law has emerged. Despite finding little
enlightenment in the debates of the framers of the United States Constitution regarding the intended scope of double jeopardy protection
and no evidence to suggest that the framers intended to preclude
reprosecution in those instances in which the trial is prematurely terminated,' the United States Supreme Court has nevertheless recognized that the proscription against double jeopardy must extend to
trials aborted after the initiation of formal proceedings but before a
final verdict has been reached.' By ascertaining that jeopardy attaches
at a time before a final verdict has been rendered, the principle in the
United States reflects a greater concern for the rights of the individual
defendant by seeking to protect him from an abuse of the
government's awesome prosecutorial powers.'
As a result, in the United States, jeopardy attaches when the jury
has been impaneled and sworn, ' and in a nonjury trial at the time at
19. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335-36 and n.p. (3d Kerr ed. 1862). That
finality was a requirement was implicit in the four recognized pleas at bar-autrefoisacquit, autrefois convict, autrefois attaint, and former pardon. Id. at *335-38. For a discussion of the use of these pleas in English and American Law, see Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S.
(18 Wail.) 163, 169-74 (1873). See also J. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE IN
CRIMINAL CASES §§ 435-60 (35th ed. T.R.F. Butler & M. Garsia 1969).
20. For a discussion of the English rule and the suggestion that this was likewise the
intent of the framers of the Constitution, see Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution
Problem, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1273 (1964) [hereinafter cited as The ReprosecutionProblem]. See also Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary, supra note 15, at 888.
21. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 201-02 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 805 (2d ed. 1959); The
Reprosecution Problem, supra note 20, at 1276-77.
22. Retrial After Mistria4 supra note 15, at 1272.
23. It has been suggested that the American system is more consistent with the aims
of double jeopardy protection. Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary,
supra note 15, at 888. The English system clearly emphasized the vindication of society's
interest in prosecuting and punishing alleged criminals; the American system, on the
other hand, displays a much greater sensitivity for the individual rights of the criminal
defendant.
24. It is generally recognized that Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), is
explicit authority for the proposition that jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled
and sworn. That jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn is predicated
upon a recognition of the need to protect the interest of an accused in retaining a chosen
jury. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978) (the federal rule that jeopardy attaches
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which the first evidence is presented." Once jeopardy has attached,
the general constitutional mandate operates to prevent the government" from reprosecuting a defendant regardless of whether the trial
ended in a verdict or was aborted prior to a verdict.' Although this
proscription against double jeopardy could have been construed as an
absolute one, the American system of criminal justice has attempted to
strike a delicate balance between the rights of the individual and the
competing societal interests. If the original proceeding has been
aborted prior to verdict, the propriety of any subsequent prosecution
must be evaluated in light of the competing equities of bringing the
guilty to justice" while securing to the defendant his rights to protection from harassment and anxiety and to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal." Thus, once jeopardy has attached, the accused
may thereafter be retried only if one of the recognized exceptions that
will defeat a plea of former jeopardy can be shown."
III.

UNITED STATES V. PEREZ AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
MANIFEST NECESSITY EXCEPTION

In 1824, the United States Supreme Court first considered the permissibility of reprosecution after mistrial in the landmark decision of
1
in which tho Court articulated a standard that
United States v. Perez,"
when the jury is impaneled and sworn is an integral part of the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy and therefore is applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment). See also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
25. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975); McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d
640, 642 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 610 (1936); Corneno v. United States, 48 F.2d 69
(9th Cir. 1931).
26. The double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment was made directly applicable to the states in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Prior to Benton, federal
double jeopardy standards were not applicable against the states. Only when a kind of
jeopardy subjected a defendant to "a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will
not endure it" did the fourteenth amendment apply. See id.at 793 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937)).
27. See Retrial After Mistrial supra note 15, at 1272. See also Illinois v. Somerville,
410 U.S. 458 (1973); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Downum v. United States,
372 U.S. 734 (1963).
28. See The Reprosecution Problem, supra note 20, at 1274 (pronouncement of the
policies to be served by the double jeopardy clause should not obscure the presence of important countervailing considerations- the public's interest in fair trials designed to end
in just judgments and in preventing the guilty from going unpunished).
29. See Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary, supra note 15, at 889.
30. See notes 39-42 and accompanying text infra. See also notes 11-15 and accompanying text supra.
31. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
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has since become the fountainhead of double jeopardy jurisprudence in
the context of mistrials. In Perez, jurors who were unable to agree on
a verdict were discharged without the consent of the defendant. When
the defendant was thereafter held for retrial, his double jeopardy plea
was rejected, and he appealed his conviction on those grounds. The
Supreme Court concluded that reprosecution was not barred because
the trial court had properly declared the mistrial."
Speaking through Justice Story, the Court stated that "the law has
invested Courts of Justice with the authority to discharge a jury from
giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, there is a manifest
necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be
defeated."' The Court emphasized that the trial judge was to exercise
sound discretion when determining whether the particular circumstances warranted a mistrial declaration." Moreover, this discretion,
the Court warned, "ought to be used with the greatest caution, under
urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes."'
The inherent vagueness of the Perez standard has spawned
divergent views regarding its intended meaning, and has historically
enabled the Court to accommodate differing perceptions of the double
jeopardy proscription without noticeably violating the mandate of
Perez." The language in Perez had suggested that mistrial declarations
would be carefully scrutinized by appellate courts, and that reprosecution would be permitted only when a true "manifest necessity" existed
for the mistrial declaration. However, since the language in Perez also
required trial judges to exercise sound discretion and empowered them
to declare a mistrial for plain and obvious causes only, appellate courts
32. Id. at 580. For a more complete discussion of the implications of Perez; see Is the
Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary, supra note 15, at 893, in which it is suggested that there are three possible interpretations of the Perez standard. The first standard is that either "manifest necessity" or the "ends of public justice" may justify a
mistrial declaration. A second interpretation results in a test in which only "manifest
necessity" justifies declaring a mistrial; the "ends of public justice" are viewed as justifying not the mistrial declaration, but rather subjection of the accused to a second jeopardy.
The third interpretation requires the concurrence of both factors.
33. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580.
34. Id
35. Id
36. See generally Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary, supra note
15, at 890. The Supreme Court has also repeatedly emphasized that application of the
manifest necessity standard does not lend itself to rigid rules, and each case must "turn
on the particular facts." See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737 (1963). Accord,
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 45 (1973). See also United States ex rel Russo v. Superior
Court, 483 F.2d 7, 13 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973); Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91, 97, 288 A.2d 727, 731, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 867 (1972).
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began to display an inordinate amount of deference to a trial court's
decision to abort a criminal prosecution because of manifest necessity,
and essentially engaged in a process of rubber-stamping the decisions
of trial judges.87 Perez thus came to be recognized for the proposition
that the authority of appellate courts to question the discretion of the
trial court in declaring a mistrial is narrowly circumscribed.8 As a
result, circumstances in which a second trial may be held even though
the first jury was discharged without reaching a verdict and without
the defendant's consent include, inter alia, jury deadlock," jury bias,'
and illness of the judge' 1 or of a member of the jury."
In the last two decades, however, there has emerged in the Court a
discernible trend toward prescribing certain flexible guidelines for
lower courts to utilize in determining whether to abort a trial without
incurring the risk that the defendant will be insulated from reprosecution. Unfortunately, the Court's pronouncements in attempting to
clarify this area have lacked consistency, and although the manifest
necessity standard has been adhered to repeatedly, the emergence of
these conflicting interpretations has created a considerable amount of
confusion in the lower courts.
37. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 202 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
879 (1952); United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 584 (1941).
38. See Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961). Perhaps the most egregious application of this discretionary standard occurred in Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424
(1953). In Brock the trial judge declared a mistrial after two of the prosecution's corroborating witnesses refused to testify, invoking the privilege against self-incrimination.
Although it was clear that the mistrial was declared to enable the prosecutor to benefit
from the testimony of the witnesses after pending charges against them were resolved,
the Supreme Court found no constitutional bar to retrial. See generally Schulhofer, note 4
supra (suggesting that the large degree of deference exhibited to trial judges is often
misplaced).
39. See, e.g., Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S.
263 (1892); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
40. See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (reprosecution not barred when mistrial declared following discovery that one member of jury was disqualified
because a member of the grand jury that had indicted the defendant); Simmons v. United
States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (juror disqualified because acquainted with the defendant);
United States v. Cimino, 224 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1955).
41. See, e.g., Freeman v. United States, 237 F. 815 (2d Cir. 1916); Commonwealth v.
Robson, 461 Pa. 615, 337 A.2d 573, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934 (1975) (illness of the judge
preventing continuation of the trial for a period of several weeks at the least constitutes
manifest necessity for the declaration of a mistrial).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 584
(1941) (mistrial declaration upheld because juror was "incapacitated to continue"); Stocks
v. State, 91 Ga. 831, 18 S.E. 847 (1893) (illness in the family of a juror).

Comment

1979
A.

Gori v. United States: Vesting Maximum
Discretion in the Trial Judge

The analytical point of departure is Gori v. United States," decided
in 1961, in which the Court first undertook to define the "manifest
necessity" test. In doing so, the Court established a standard for determining the propriety of a mistrial declaration that would vest nearly
unbridled discretion in the trial judge when making the appropriate
determination." The trial judge in Gori declared a mistrial sua sponte
and with neither approval of nor objection by the defendant's counsel,
apparently because of his belief that the line of questioning employed
by the prosecuting attorney presaged inquiry calculated to inform the
jury of other crimes by the accused. Speaking through Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court acknowledged that since the record on its
face failed to reveal the basis for the mistrial declaration, the reasons
which induced the trial court to declare the mistrial were unclear;'5 but
the Court nevertheless deferred to the discretion of the trial judge."
In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated that it had consistently
declined to sharply scrutinize the exercise of that discretion since the
trial judge is best situated to make such a reasoned decision.'7 More
importantly, however, the Court emphasized its unwillingness to bar
retrial "where it clearly appears that
a mistrial has been granted in
8
the sole interest of the defendant."'
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Brennan, and Chief
Justice Warren, sharply disagreed with the majority's analysis of the
scope of discretion conferred by Perez and its broad application of the
manifest necessity standard." Although the dissenters agreed that the
propriety of a mistrial declaration rests within the sound discretion of
the trial court, they admonished the majority by reminding that such
discretion should be narrowly confined within certain guidelines and
exercised "only in very extraordinary and striking circumstances."'
43. 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
44. The Court stated: "It is also clear that 'This Court has long favored the rule of
discretion in the trial judge to declare a mistrial and to require another panel to try the
defendant if the ends of justice will be best served ...
Id. at 368 (citing Brock v. North
Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 427 (1953)). See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
45. Id. at 365-66.
46. Id. at 368.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 369.
49. Id. at 370 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
50. Id at 371-72 (citing United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622 (No. 14,858) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1815)).
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Downum and Jorn: Imposing Constraints Upon the Trial Judge's
Discretion While Establishing More Concrete Guidelines

The dissent in Gori foreshadowed the outcome of the Court's 1963
decision in Downum v. United States,5 1 in which it held for the first time
that a second prosecution was barred following a mistrial declaration.
In Downum, the trial judge discharged the jury on the prosecution's
motion and over the defendant's objection when a key prosecution
witness failed to appear in court.' When a second jury was impaneled
two days later, the defendant pleaded double jeopardy, but his plea
was overruled and a conviction followed. A majority of the Court
reversed that conviction," however, and, speaking through Justice
Douglas, again emphasized that the application of the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy is not limited to extreme instances.
The trial judge's discretion to discharge the jury, the Court reasoned,
is to be exercised only when there is an "imperious necessity" to do
so." The Court acknowledged that there are times when a defendant's
valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must
be subordinated to the public interest," but maintained that in
evaluating the competing interests any doubt about the propriety of a
mistrial declaration should be resolved in favor of the liberty of the
citizen." Accordingly, since the mistrial declaration in Downum was
subject to prosecutorial manipulation because it provided the state
with a more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant at a subsequent trial, reprosecution was clearly impermissible under the double
jeopardy clause. 7
51. 372 U.S. 734 (1963). This change in the Court's philosophy was probably attributable to the departure of Justices Whittaker and Frankfurter, members of the majority in Gori, who were replaced by Justices White and Goldberg. Justice Goldberg
became the fifth member of the majority in Downum.
52. Id. at 735.
53. The majority in Downum included Justices Douglas, Black, Brennan, Goldberg,
and Chief Justice Warren. Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White dissented.
54. Id. (citing Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 738. Although the Court's decision in Downum apparently conflicted with
the broad discretionary standard announced in Gori, at least one commentator has suggested that Downum was not a departure from the Gori standard of review, but rather an
application of that standard to a particular series of events. See Comment, Mistrial and
Double Jeopardy, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 937, 943 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Mistrial and Double Jeopardy]. But see The Reprosecution Problem, supra note 20, at 1278-79 (although
Gori and Downum are theoretically reconcilable, the cases cannot be reconciled on their
facts).
57. 372 U.S. at 737.
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In 1971, a plurality of the Court" in United States v. Jorn" reaffirmed the position it had adopted in Downum of requiring appellate
courts to carefully scrutinize the appropriateness of the trial court's
mistrial declaration.' In Jorn, the defendant was tried for willfully
assisting in the preparation of fraudulent income tax returns. Among
the witnesses prepared to testify for the government were five taxpayers whose income tax returns the defendant had allegedly falsely
prepared. After the first of these witnesses was called, but prior to the
commencement of direct examination, defense counsel suggested that
these witnesses be warned of their constitutional rights. Although the
initial witness expressed a willingness to testify and informed the
court that he had been apprised of his rights when first contacted by
the Internal Revenue Service, the trial judge indicated that he did not
believe any warnings had been given and refused to permit the witness to testify until he had consulted an attorney."' When the trial
judge learned that the prosecution intended to call four other similarly
situated witnesses, he declared a mistrial sua sponte to afford each of
the witnesses an opportunity to consult with counsel."2 In upholding
the lower court's dismissal of the information on the ground of former
jeopardy, the Court emphasized the defendant's right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal.' Justice Harlan maintained that a
mistrial declaration imposes an inordinate amount of strain upon a
defendant regardless of the trial judge's motivation." He concluded,
therefore, that the double jeopardy clause commands trial judges to
scrupulously examine viable alternatives before declaring a mistrial."
58. The opinion of the Court in Jorn is technically a plurality opinion since only four
of the Justices -Harlan, Douglas, Marshall, and Burger-could agree on the threshold
issue of appealability. Justices Black and Brennan believed that the Court lacked proper
jurisdiction to reach the merits of the case. But because the Court decided to reach the
merits, they concurred in the judgment. The dissenting Justices- Blackmun, Stewart, and
White-agreed with the plurality on the jurisdiction issue, but dissented from the plurality's double jeopardy analysis. In light of the fact that only a plurality of the Court could
agree in Join, not all lower courts have followed the decision when resolving similar
double jeopardy issues. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 15 Md. App. 73, 87-89, 289 A.2d 348,
356-58 (Ct. Spec. App. 1972). But see Somerville v. Illinois, 401 U.S. 1007 (1971) (per
curiam) (Court directed United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to follow
Downum and Jorn even though the latter was a plurality opinion).
59. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
60. Id. at 486-87.
61. 1d. at 472-73. The trial judge was, of course, apprehensive that the witnesses
might incriminate themselves.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 480 (citing Wade v. Hunter, 334 U.S. 684, 689 (1949)).
64. Id. at 483. Compare the text accompanying note 48 supra.
65. Id. at 485 & 487.
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Moreover, the Court indicated in Jorn that retrial might well be
barred even when the mistrial was granted on the defendant's motion
if the request had been precipitated by judicial or prosecutorial overreaching designed to avoid an acquittal."
When viewed in combination with Downum, Jorn seemingly imposed
considerable constraints upon the nearly unbridled discretion previously
enjoyed by trial judges in determining whether to abort a trial prior to
verdict. Any trial judge considering the possibility of declaring a
mistrial would now have to evaluate all reasonable alternatives when
deciding if the necessity of mistrial outweighs the defendant's right to
have his trial completed by the originally impaneled jury. 7 Consequently, Jorn would appear to be the foremost effort undertaken by
the Court to provide guidance for lower courts addressing the mistrial
dilemma.
Jorn, however, was not the final pronouncement of the Court, and
did not terminate the controversy over the appropriate interpretation
of the Perez standard." Shortly thereafter, a reorganization of the
Court occurred, 9 and subsequent decisions cast considerable doubt
upon the continued vitality of the Downum-Jorn standard.
C.

Somerville and Dinitz: A Retreat by the Burger Court

In its 1973 decision of Illinois v. Somerville, 70 the Burger Court initially considered the double jeopardy problem in the context of retrial
following a mistrial declaration. Because of a fatally defective indictment not curable under Illinois law, the trial court granted the prosecutor's motion for a mistrial after the jury had been impaneled and
sworn.7 1 A second indictment was then handed down and a second trial
66. See id. at 484-85 & n.12.
67. See 400 U.S. at 487. See also United States v. Grasso, 552 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir.
1977); United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 168-69 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Brahm, 459 F.2d 546, 549-50 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972).
68. For a list of cases after Jorn that adopted the Gori analysis, see Uomment,
Criminal Procedure-Double Jeopardy-Trial Courts Granted Broad Discretion To
Determine "Manifest Necessity" for Mistrial, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 682, 688 n.55 (1973).
Pennsylvania, however, has chosen to follow the plurality opinion in Jorn. See Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91, 288 A.2d 727 (1972) (prejudicial comment by prosecutor);
Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 446 Pa. 24, 285 A.2d 189 (1971) (state witness absent); Commonwealth v. Richbourg, 442 Pa. 147, 275 A.2d 345 (1971) (prosecutor feared his own error
would result in unjust acquittal).
69. Justices Harlan and Black were replaced by Justices Powell and Rehnquist.
70. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
71. Under the applicable Illinois criminal statute, intent is a necessary element of the
crime of theft, the omission of which rendered the indictment insufficient to charge a
crime; the defect was thus a "jurisdictional" one. The defect would undoubtedly have been
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commenced after the defendant's double jeopardy plea was overruled.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, sentence was imposed, and the
Illinois courts upheld the conviction." The defendant sought federal
habeas corpus relief, but his petition was denied. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light
of its intervening decision in Jorn.8 On remand, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted the requested relief,
concluding that retrial was precluded by Jorn.' But the Supreme
Court reversed, and implicitly eradicated the standard of review
established in Downum and Jorn by holding that retrial was justified
'
on the ground of "furthering the ends of public justice."75
In reaching
its conclusion that the prosecutor's conduct erected no constitutional
barrier to retrial, the Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, attempted to distinguish Downum and Jorn by suggesting that the delay
caused by the mistrial declaration did not enable the prosecution to
strengthen its case and by emphasizing that no less drastic alternatives were available." Moreover, although the Court acknowledged
that the possibility of prosecutorial manipulation would present a different question, it apparently perceived any misconduct by the prosecutor in Somerville to be, at most, mere negligence that should not
preclude reprosecution."
By relying upon the "ends of public justice" aspect of the Perez
standard, rather than the "manifest necessity" aspect,t the Somerville
Court resolved the process of balancing interests in evaluating the propriety of a mistrial declaration in favor of the state's interest in pros-

raised on appeal, and the trial court therefore concluded that further proceedings were
useless. Id. at 459-60.
72. Id. at 460.
73. Id.
74. United States ex rel. Somerville v. Illinois, 447 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd 410
U.S. 458 (1973).
75. 410 U.S. at 464 & 469. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
76. Id. at 469. See note 71 supra. See also The Double Jeopardy Dilemma, supra
note 16, at 981 n.73 (Somerville might have weak precedential value as a result of its unique factual situation based upon Illinois' established rules of criminal procedure).
77. 410 U.S. at 464. See text accompanying notes 97-98 infra. The Somerville Court
thus placed the burden of suffering the ramifications of the government's negligence upon
the defendant, and apparently reduced to a "mere weighty consideration" the defendant's
right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. Id at 471. The Court specifically noted that "the trial judge's action was a rational determination designed to
implement a legitimate state policy, with no suggestion that the implementation of that
policy in this manner could be manipulated so as to prejudice the defendant." Id. at 469.
78. Id at 464 & 469. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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ecuting criminal defendants.79 Although the Court attempted to
distinguish Downum and Jorn, it appears that the impropriety that
precluded retrial in those cases was no more egregious than that which
occurred in Somerville. Ostensibly, the strict manifest necessity stan8
dard of Downum and Jorn would have mandated a contrary result. 0
United States v. Dinitz81 represents the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement in this area. In Dinitz, one of the defendant's two
attorneys was expelled from the courtroom by the trial judge for
engaging in improper conduct. Upon learning that the defendant's remaining counsel was not prepared to proceed with the trial, the court
posited three possible alternatives from which the defendant might
choose, one of which was the declaration of a mistrial.82 The defendant
moved for a mistrial, the government prosecutor did not oppose the
motion, and the trial judge granted the mistrial request, expressing his
belief that such a course would serve the interest of justice. Before his
second trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that retrial would violate the double jeopardy clause because
his mistrial request had been induced by judicial overreaching. His motion was denied, and he was convicted by a jury." On direct appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed en
banc," concluding that the defendant's request for a mistrial should be
ignored and the case treated as though the trial judge had declared a
mistrial over the objection of the defendant. 85 Accordingly, the'double
jeopardy clause precluded retrial because there had been no manifest
79. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Somerville contains numerous allusions to overriding principles of federalism. For example, he stated: "We believe that in light of the
State's established rules of criminal procedure, the trial judge's declaration of a mistrial
was not an abuse of discretion . . . Federal courts should not be quick to conclude that
simply because a state procedure does not conform to the corresponding federal statute or
rule, it does not serve a legitimate state policy." 410 U.S. at 468.
80. See Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary, supra note 15, at 904.
81. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
82. Id. at 611. The defendant was also giventhe choices of a stay or recess pending
application to the court of appeals for review of the propriety of expelling counsel, or continuing the trial with remaining counsel.
83. 1d. at 603-05. At his second trial, the defendant, a third year law student at the
time of his arrest, chose to defend himself. Id. at 605 n.4.
84. 504 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (per curiam), rev.d, 424 U.S. 600 (1976). Initially, a divided panel of the court of appeals reversed the defendant's conviction, holding
that retrial violated the defendant's constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy.
492 F.2d 53 (5th Cir.), affd en banc, 504 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
Upon rehearing, the en banc per curiam opinion essentially adopted the reasoning of the
panel majority.
85. 492 F.2d at 58-59.
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necessity requiring the expulsion of trial counsel." The court of appeals perceived the necessity of requiring something more substantial
than a "Hobson's choice" before a defendant can be said to have relinquished voluntarily his right to proceed before the first jury."
The Supreme Court reversed. Speaking through Justice Stewart,
the Court acknowledged that in such circumstances the defendant
generally does face a "Hobson's choice" between relinquishing his first
jury and continuing a trial tainted by prejudicial prosecutorial or
judicial error. The Court nevertheless believed that the conclusion
reached by the court of appeals-that the manifest necessity standard
should be applied to a mistrial motion when the defendant has no
choice but to request a mistrial-undermines, rather than furthers, the
protections of the double jeopardy clause." Stewart emphasized that
traditional waiver concepts have little relevance when the defendant
must determine whether or not to request or consent to a mistrial in
response to judicial or prosecutorial error; the paramount consideration is the defendant's retention of control over the course to be
followed in the event that such error occurs."9 Although it again noted
that the double jeopardy clause does protect a defendant against
governmental actions intended to provoke mistrial requests, the Court
found no such bad faith conduct since the defendant chose to move for
a mistrial rather than continue with his other attorney.9
Thus, while the decisions in Downum and Jorn indicated a movement toward establishing more concrete guidelines in evaluating double
jeopardy problems in the context of reprosecution following a mistrial
declaration, the subsequent decisions in Somerville and Dinitz suggest
a return to an unstructured case-by-case analysis. 1

86. Id. at 60-61.
87. Id at 59.
88. 424 U.S. at 609-10. The Court reasoned that if severely prejudicial error did exist,
the defendant might well consider an immediate new trial preferable to the alternative of
a probable conviction followed by an appeal, a reversal of the conviction, and a later
retrial. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (double jeopardy clause presents no
obstacle to retrial if conviction is set aside by the trial judge or reversed on appeal). Thus,
the Court rejected the court of appeals rationale since it essentially instructed trial
judges to reject the most meritorious mistrial motion in the absence of manifest necessity
and instead required the trial to proceed to its conclusion despite a legitimate claim of
seriously prejudicial error.
89. 424 U.S. at 609.
90. Id. at 611-12.
91. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464-67 (1973) (Court has eschewed rigid
mechanical rules since Perez, and virtually all of the cases turn on the particular facts and
thus escape meaningful categorization).
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REPROSECUTION AFTER MISTRIAL GRANTED
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION

In evaluating a double jeopardy challenge following a successful
defense motion for mistrial, courts are now confronted not only with
the seemingly inconsistent pronouncements of the Supreme Court, but
also with the recognition that no Supreme Court decision has actually
barred reprosecution following a successful defense motion for mistrial
because of governmental misconduct. Thus, because of the absence of
any principled statement regarding this facet of the double jeopardy
clause, any challenge in this area must be examined against the
background and general framework provided by the foregoing case
law.
A starting point for analysis is to ascertain whether the defendant's
motion for mistrial is clearly voluntary and thus removes any constitutional barrier to reprosecution.92 When the events that precipitated the
defendant's mistrial motion are attributable to factors beyond governmental control, permitting reprosecution is easily understood" because
of society's interest in punishing the guilty.
On the other hand, when the defendant's mistrial motion is attributable to governmental misconduct, the constitutional barrier to
retrial should not be automatically removed.9 ' Rather, the reviewing
court should carefully analyze the activities of the prosecutor or judge
which led to the defendant's mistrial motion to determine whether
reprosecution should be barred, since permitting reprosecution as a
matter of course in such instances would seemingly ignore the defendant's interest in having his trial completed by a particular tribunal
free from the taint of prejudicial error. When such misconduct is present, the defendant technically does retain the opportunity to complete
his trial before the first jury chosen. But because the taint of error
significantly increases the possibility of conviction that may not be corrected on appeal, the defendant's decision to request a mistrial rather
92. See, e.g., United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976); United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 467 (1964).
93. See Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 532.
94. Until rather recently, lower courts automatically rejected double jeopardy
challenges whenever the defense made a successful mistrial motion. See, e.g., Leigh v.
United States, 329 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (a defendant cannot plead former jeopardy
when the jury before whom he was first on trial was discharged on his own motion or
with his consent); United States v. Burrell, 324 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963) (defendant cannot
successfully plead the bar of double jeopardy when mistrial was granted on his own motion and with his express consent); Roberts v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 563, 567 (E.D.
Mo. 1972) (double jeopardy claims waived solely because all defendants made motion for
mistrial).
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than retain his first jury cannot be characterized as a purely voluntary
one. Thus, the justification traditionally offered in support of
reprosecution -that the defendant retains the right to proceed before
the original tribunal and perhaps obtain an acquittal-is significantly
diluted when the element of misconduct has tainted the proceedings.
In Dinitz, Somerville, and Jorn, the Supreme Court recognized this
"Hobson's choice" situation, and in each instance stated in dictum that
a defendant's double jeopardy claim must be "considered" if his
mistrial motion was the product of prosecutorial manipulation or overreaching. 5 However, the type of misconduct embraced by the term
overreaching is a question that remains largely unanswered." The
critical inquiry thus becomes one of determining the maximum kind of
misconduct that can be endured before it is viewed as manipulation or
overreaching that will actually bar reprosecution even though the
mistrial declaration has been granted on the defendant's motion.
Under any Supreme Court language, mere negligence on the part of
the prosecutor apparently erects no constitutional barrier to retrialY
As yet, no court has concluded that mere prosecutorial negligence
precludes reprosecution, for the imposition of this standard would
place an unreasonable burden on the prosecutor to conduct flawless
trials; apparently, society's interest in seeing criminal justice completed operates to prevent the prosecution from being subjected to
such a rigid standard of conduct. Also, a mere negligence standard
might have the anomalous effect of reducing, rather than increasing,
the amount of protection afforded criminal defendants. As a practical
matter, if reprosecution were precluded each time a mistrial is
declared on the defendant's motion because of prosecutorial error, trial
judges could conceivably be encouraged to reject mistrial requests as a
matter of course regardless of how egregious the error on the part of
the prosecutor. Criminal defendants would thus have to rely upon the
appellate process to correct any error, and would still be required to
endure a second prosecution even if the error were corrected on ap95. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976); Illinois v. Somerville, 410
U.S. 458 (1973); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 & 485 n.12 (1971).
96. See United States v. Wilson, 534 F.2d 76, 80 n.6 (6th Cir. 1976) (it is unclear from
the Dinitz opinion whether overreaching is limited to intentional misconduct or whether it
should extend to gross negligence on the part of the judge or prosecutor which led to
mistrial); Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 640, 373 A.2d 90, 108 (1977) (plurality opinion) (it is unclear from the United States Supreme Court cases whether overreaching extends to grossly negligent acts by the prosecutor).
97. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464 (1973); United States v. Martin, 561
F.2d 135, 139 (8th Cir. 1977); Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977)
(plurality opinion).
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peal." Moreover, mere prosecutorial negligence probably would not
taint the proceeding in a manner that would significantly enhance the
possibility of conviction, and therefore the defendant would not be confronted with a true "Hobson's choice" situation.
On the other hand, it seems clear that a showing of bad faith intent
designed to provoke a mistrial request should trigger the double
jeopardy proscription" and vitiate the fact that the mistrial was
technically granted at the request of the defendant. Any other result
would seemingly encourage the government to abuse its awesome prosecutorial powers, especially in those instances where an acquittal
seems to be apparent. Moreover, a contrary result would eviscerate
the constitutional mandate that was designed to erect safeguards
against repeated prosecutions and to prohibit continuing embarrassment, expense, and anxiety to the defendant. 1"
The few cases in which the conduct of the prosecution has been held
to preclude a second trial seem to indicate that the prosecutor's intent
to precipitate a mistrial must be obvious.10' But the very fact that so
few cases do exist in which reprosecution has actually been barred
because of bad faith prosecutorial misconduct 2' suggests that such a
standard may not be broad enough in scope to adequately safeguard
the rights of criminal defendants against the government's awesome
prosecutorial powers. Likewise, it reflects that establishing the requisite mental state of the prosecutor is an awesome burden, if not an
insuperable one, in the absence of an express declaration by the prosecutor that he is engaging in the activity for the explicit purpose of
provoking a mistrial request. Furthermore, since such blatant misconduct would ordinarily result in a sua sponte mistrial declaration, " the
defendant would never be in a situation where he must actually request the mistrial; thus the existence of such a standard may be conceptually sterile for all practical purposes.
Despite the fact that the vast majority of courts which have construed the term overreaching have concluded that reprosecution
98. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (when a conviction is set aside
because of trial error the double jeopardy clause does not preclude reprosecution).
99. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400
U.S. 470, 485 & n.12 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963).
100. See note 17 supra.
101. See Standard for Reprosecution, supra note 16, at 490. See also note 18 supra.
102. See note 18 supra. Perhaps the noticeable absence of authority also suggests that
it is highly unlikely that a prosecutor will engage in such egregious activity and incur the
risk of having a second prosecution barred.
103. See Retrial After Mistrial supra note 15, at 1279; The Double Jeopardy Dilemma, supra note 16, at 982.
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should be barred only upon a showing of bad faith intent on the part of
the prosecutor,'1' several recent decisions have undertaken to provide
greater safeguards to the criminal defendant by requiring the prosecution to conform to a more stringent standard of conduct.
In the 1973 decision of United States v. Beasley,' 5 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit announced that "when a mistrial
results from prosecutorial error which does not amount to gross
negligence or intentional misconduct, the state is not barred from
reprosecuting the defendant.""lN Because the court of appeals in
Beasley found that the record disclosed no evidence of gross
negligence or intentional misconduct on the part of the prosecutor, it
concluded that there was no constitutional barrier to retrial and conviction.0 7 Since Beasley, however, several courts have seized upon the
..gross negligence or intentional misconduct" standard for guidance in
determining whether to bar reprosecution after misconduct by the prosecutor has induced the defendant to move for a mistrial.
In United States v. Kessler, 8 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit relied upon the standard it had announced in
Beasley and concluded that reprosecution should be barred because the
government had engaged in intentional misconduct, even though there
was no showing of bad-faith intent to produce a mistrial request by the
defendant." In Kessler, the government was permitted to introduce,
over objection, allegedly admissible testimony from several witnesses
under the well-recognized co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule
as well as demonstrative evidence on the foundation laid by these
declarations. "' During the course of trial, it became clear that not only

104. See, e.g., United States v. Sanabria, 548 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 98 S. Ct. 2170 (1978); United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183, 1188 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974); Commonwealth v. Potter, 478 Pa. 251, 386 A.2d
918 (1978) (per curiam).
105. 479 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924, reh. denied, 414 U.S. 1052
(1973).
106. Id. at 1126.
107. Id. at 1127. In Beasley, a mistrial had been granted at the defendant's request as
the result of a single question put to the defendant's chief alibi witness during crossexamination. Defense counsel had requested the mistrial on the basis that the
prosecutor's question was so highly prejudicial that it would preclude the defendant from
receiving a fair jury trial. Although the court of appeals was cognizant that the question
was undoubtedly an improper one, it found nothing in the record to suggest that the prosecutor intended to abort the proceedings in order to improve the chances of conviction
upon retrial. Id at 1126-27.
108. 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976).
109. Id at 1257-58.
110. Id at 1249-51.
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were the declarations inadmissible because outside the scope of the coconspirator exception, but also that the demonstrative evidence had no
nexus with the alleged conspiracy. The defendants then moved for a
mistrial, which the trial court granted despite the government's opposition."1 When the second trial commenced, the defendants' motions
to dismiss the indictments were granted by the trial court."1 On appeal, the court of appeals emphasized that to find prosecutorial overreaching, the prosecutor must have engaged in either grossly negligent
or intentional misconduct."' Finding that the government knew in advance of trial that the hearsay declarations and demonstrative
evidence were clearly inadmissible under the circumstances, the court
of appeals concluded that there was intentional misconduct by the
government which caused serious prejudice to the defendants' right to
a fair jury trial, and therefore barred reprosecution."'
A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit represents the most significant endeavor undertaken by
an appellate court to expand the double jeopardy safeguards afforded
criminal defendants where prosecutorial misconduct has occurred. In
United States v. Martin,115 the defendant was charged with making a
false oath and account by fraudulently transferring and concealing
assets in contemplation of bankruptcy in violation of a federal
statute." 6 Martin filed a motion in limine requesting the trial court to
prohibit any reference to student loans because of previous inimical
publicity." 7 This motion was granted, but the court denied Martin's request to prohibit the government's attorney from reading Martin's
grand jury testimony as substantive evidence, since the prosecutor
assured the court that the irrelevant statements contained in the
grand jury testimony had been excluded. The trial court indicated,
however, that Martin's objection to the use of the grand jury
111.
112.
113.
denied,
114.
115.

Id. at 1251-52.
Id. at 1252.
Id at 1256 and n.15 (citing United States v. Beasley, 479 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.), cert.
414 U.S. 924, reh. denied, 414 U.S. 1052 (1973)).
Id at 1257.
561 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1977). For an analysis of the Martin decision and its im-

plications, see The Double Jeopardy Dilemma, note 16 supra.

116. Id at 136. See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1976). In the first count, Martin was charged with
concealing money and cash totalling $565.12. The second count charged Martin with concealing assets in the amount of $2060.12.
117. 561 F.2d at 137. Martin attached as exhibits to his motion in limine 22 Arkansas
Gazette newspaper articles illustrating the publicity which accompanied his attempt to
discharge the student loan debts. In addition to the newspaper articles, Martin and his
wife filed affidavits attesting to obscene and racial remarks directed at them as a result of
their bankruptcy petition.
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testimony would be treated as a continuing objection. 118 Early in the
trial, the prosecutor read a substantial portion of the grand jury testimony to the jury, but failed to delete the disputed material.19 Martin
then moved for a mistrial, which the district court granted."' Between
his first and second trials, Martin filed a motion to dismiss the indictment contending, inter alia, that the double jeopardy clause foreclosed
a second prosecution. Martin's motion 2was denied, and he was convicted on both counts of the indictment.1 '
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial
court had erred in denying Martin's motion to dismiss since the
reading of the irrelevant grand jury testimony constituted prosecutorial overreaching that gave Martin no choice but to move for a
mistrial and subject himself to the ordeal of a second trial." In analyzing the question of whether the double jeopardy clause foreclosed a
second trial, the court of appeals emphasized that even if the government's actions of reading the testimony were not designed to provoke
a mistrial request, at a minimum they constituted gross negligence."'
Acknowledging that mere negligence by the prosecutor is not the type
of overreaching contemplated by Dinitz,"4 the court of appeals nevertheless believed that gross negligence constitutes prosecutorial error
undertaken to harass or prejudice the defendant-that gross
negligence can be accurately characterized as the type of prosecutorial
overreaching which the double jeopardy clause seeks to bar.2 5
Dissenting, Judge Henley maintained that no Supreme Court case
existed in which the Court had held that gross negligence, or intentional prosecutorial error not calculated to produce a mistrial, will support a claim of double jeopardy by one who moves for a mistrial.,"
Judge Henley read Dinitz'" and Jorn'" as requiring either that the
prosecution act with 'intent to induce a request for mistrial by the
defendant or that the prosecution deliberately prejudice the defendant
by procuring a trial at a different time and under. circumstances less
118. Id.
119. Id
120. Id The district court maintained that since any conviction would be set aside on
appeal because of the error, there was no alternative other than to declare a mistrial.
121. Id at 138.
122. Id. at 141.
123. Id at 140.
124. Id. at 139. See notes 81-90 and accompanying text supra.
125. 561 F.2d at 140.
126. Id. at 142 (Henley, J., dissenting).
127. See notes 81-90 and accompanying text supra
128. See notes 58-67 and accompanying text supr&
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favorable to the defendant.'" He therefore concluded that the double
jeopardy proscription was inapplicable because of the absence of any
egregious error by the prosecution compelling a finding of intentional
harassment or intent to abort the trial. 8 '
V.

THE PENNSYLVANIA EXPERIENCE: AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE

SPECTRE OF UNCERTAINTY CREATED BY PEREZ AND ITS PROGENY

An examination of Pennsylvania case law since 1970 provides a clear
illustration of the problems and uncertainty confronted by courts that
have attempted to interpret the Supreme Court pronouncements and
to articulate a principal statement of the kind of governmental misconduct that should preclude a second prosecution. It also reveals the subjectivity employed by these courts in their attempt to define the kind
of misconduct embraced by the term overreaching: specifically, that
the definitions are predicated upon the philosophical persuasions of
each individual court member regarding the intended scope of the double
jeopardy clause and the policies which.that clause was designed to implement.
Prior to 1977, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied a standard
that strongly favored reprosecution whenever the first trial had been
aborted at the defendant's request, even if the mistrial request were
prompted by prosecutorial misconduct. For example, in its 1970 decision in Commonwealth v. Wright,' the court, after canvassing the
salient Pennsylvania cases in this area, 8 ' concluded that a defendant
who has moved for a mistrial in response to prosecutorial misconduct
could be retried if the prosecution has not invited the mistrial in order
to secure another, more favorable opportunity to convict the accused."'
Although the court recognized that such a rule places a heavy burden
129. 561 F.2d at 142 (Henley, J., dissenting).
130. Id at 141.
131. 439 Pa. 198, 266 A.2d 651 (1970) (unanimous decision).
132. See Commonwealth v. Metz, 425 Pa. 188, 228 A.2d 729 (1967) (reprosecution not
barred simply because trial terminates prior to verdict where mistrial is necessary and
circumstances do not create danger that the accused will be subjected to successive, oppressive prosecutions); Commonwealth v. Warfield, 424 Pa. 555, 227 A.2d 177 (1967)
(where district attorney openly acknowledged that he had deliberately caused mistrial in
first degree murder case, and mistrial was not caused by any act of the defendant, jeopardy
attached and reprosecution was barred); Commonwealth ex reL Montgomery v. Myers,
422 Pa. 180, 220 A.2d 859 (1966) (reprosecution permitted where remarks of prosecutor
not calculated to precipitate a mistrial in order to secure another, possibly more favorable
opportunity to convict the accused).
133. 439 Pa. at 201, 266 A.2d at 653. See note 132 supra.
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on the defendant to justify his double jeopardy claim, the court nevertheless reasoned that society's interest in preventing the guilty from
going unpunished outweighs the risk of harassment and the burdens
imposed upon a defendant in enduring a second trial.lu
In Wright, the defendant had requested of the trial court a ruling, in
advance of any offer by the Commonwealth, as to the admissibility of
his prior record in the event he elected to testify in his own behalf.
The trial court eventually ruled that any evidence of the defendant's
prior record was to be excluded. After the defendant had testified on
direct examination, and cross-examination had proceeded for a short
period of time, the district attorney attempted to offer into evidence
the prior record of the defendant. 8 The defendant then moved for a
mistrial which the trial court granted. Before the defendant's second
trial commenced, he pleaded double jeopardy, but his plea was denied
and he was convicted." The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the
decision of the trial court." 7
In reaching its conclusion that the double jeopardy clause did not
preclude a second trial in Wright, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
emphasized that the trial judge is in a better position to observe the
events and make an informed judgment and does not merely have a
dry record from which to work."' Therefore, the court stated that
unless the record indicates the relevant motives of the prosecutor, the
decision of the trial judge should be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion on his part.'" The record clearly indicated to the court that the
prosecutor intended, from the moment he began his cross-examination,
to offer into evidence Wright's prior record. ' But the court nevertheless concluded that the trial judge had properly exercised his
discretion in finding that the prosecutor did not intentionally cause the
mistrial in order to secure a second opportunity to convict the defendant under more favorable circumstances."' The Wright court thus
strongly suggested that reprosecution should not be barred unless
there is an express declaration by the prosecutor that he is engaging

134. Id
135. Id at 200-01, 266 A.2d at 652-53. Wright was being tried on a charge of burglary,
and the district attorney attempted to offer the defendant's record which contained six
previous burglary convictions.
136. Id at 201, 266 A.2d at 653.
137. 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 773, 260 A.2d 503 (1970) (per curiam), affd, 439 Pa. 198, 266
A.2d 651 (1970).
138. 439 Pa. at 204, 266 A.2d at 654-55.
139. Id at 204-05, 266 A.2d at 655.
140. Id at 203-04, 266 A.2d at 654.
141. Id at 205, 266 A.2d at 655.
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in prohibited conduct for the manifest purpose of provoking a mistrial
request."2
In its 1977 decision of Commonwealth v. Bolden,"' the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ostensibly abjured the Wright standard, and announced an approach that would provide greater double jeopardy protection for criminal defendants who have successfully requested mistrials
because of prosecutorial misconduct. In Bolden, the court explicitly
held that the double jeopardy clause precludes retrial whenever the
defendant's mistrial motion is predicated by either intentional misconduct or gross negligence on the part of the prosecution. 1 4 The court,
speaking through Justice Roberts, noted that it is unclear from the
United States Supreme Court cases whether overreaching is limited
to intentional misconduct or whether it extends to grossly negligent
acts by the prosecutor."' Therefore, the court maintained, since it is
extremely difficult to establish that prosecutorial error was intentional, a defendant's rights may not be adequately protected if he is required to prove that the errors were intentional. 46 Accordingly, the
47
court believed that application of the standard announced in Beasley'
and followed in Kessler"" was warranted in order to implement the
policies underlying the double jeopardy clause.'' Upon examining the
factual situation in Bolden, the court concluded that the prosecutor's
conduct did not constitute overreaching within the meaning of the
delineated standard, and therefore the double jeopardy clause did not
bar retrial.'"5
Because only Justice Manderino joined in the opinion of Justice
Roberts, the significance and precedential value of the Bolden decision

142. See note 19 supra. See also text accompanying note 101 supra.
143. 472 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977) (plurality opinion).
144. Il at 641-42, 373 A.2d at 109. The court did not believe that Dinitz compelled a
contrary result. The court recognized that certain language in Dinitz may be interpreted
to set forth the requirement that the misconduct be intentional, but nonetheless believed
that the Dinitz Court did not explicitly rule out a gross negligence standard. See id. at
n.39. But see text accompanying note 171 infra.
145. Id. at 640, 373 A.2d at 108. See United States v. Wilson, 534 F.2d 76, 80 n.6 (6th
Cir. 1976) (it is unclear from the Dinitz opinion whether overreaching is limited to intentional misconduct or whether it should extend to gross negligence on the part of the judge
or prosecutor which led to mistrial).
146. 472 Pa. at 640, 373 A.2d at 108.
147. United States v. Beasley, 479 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924, reh.
denied, 414 U.S. 1052 (1973). See text accompanying notes 105-07 supra.
148. United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976). See text accompanying
notes 108-14 supra.
149. 472 Pa. at 641, 373 A.2d at 108.
150. Id. at 642-45, 373 A.2d at 109-10.

Comment

1979

remained in doubt.151 Chief Justice Eagen merely concurred in the
result reached by a majority of the court.'52 And although Justice
Pomeroy likewise concurred in the result," he expressed sharp
dissatisfaction with the plurality opinion for reaching the issue regarding the degree of misconduct by the prosecution that will preclude
retrial, since the prosecutor's conduct constituted neither grossly
negligent nor intentional misconduct.'" He therefore characterized the
purported holding concerning gross negligence as "gratuitous and
mere dictum."'"
In its most recent pronouncement in this area, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court rejected the standard adopted by Justice Roberts in
Bolden and instead required a showing of intentional misconduct. In
Commonwealth v. Potter," the defendant Was tried on three separate
occasions for murder, and each time he was convicted.1 7 In Potter's second trial, he moved for a mistrial several times, but his motions were
denied. It was later determined by the trial court en banc that a new
trial was necessary because the defendant's constitutional right to a
fair trial had been transgressed.'" On appeal after the defendant's
i

151. The threshold question addressed by the Bolden court was whether an appeal
from a defendant's pre-trial motion to dismiss an indictment is a final appealable order, or
whether the defendant may appeal only from a judgment of sentence. Four members of
the court - Justices Roberts, Manderino, and Pomeroy, and Chief Justice Eagen - concluded
that a denial of a pre-trial application to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy
grounds may be appealed before the new trial is held. 472 Pa. at 633, 373 A.2d at 105.
Justices Nix and O'Brien dissented from the court's disposition of this issue, maintaining
that immediate appellate review was unwarranted. Id at 652-60, 373 A.2d at 114-18 (Nix,
J., dissenting).
152. Id at 646, 373 A.2d at 111 (Eagen, C. J., concurring).
153. Id. (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
154. Id at 651-52, 373 A.2d at 114.
155. Id. at 652, 373 A.2d at 114.
156. 478 Pa. 251, 386 A.2d 918 (1978) (per curiam).
157. Potter's first conviction was set aside by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
because of an improper expression of opinion by the prosecuting attorney as to the guilt
of the accused. Commonwealth v. Potter, 445 Pa. 284, 285 A.2d 492 (1971). His second conviction was set aside on a post-trial motion by the court of common pleas en banc because
of improper references to the defendant's juvenile record. See 478 Pa. at 255 n.1, 386 A.2d
at 919 n.1.
158. 478 Pa. at 257, 386 A.2d at 920. The court addressed the procedural circumstances in Potter in somewhat of an unusual manner. Potter was not a situation in
which the court was evaluating a double jeopardy plea following a mistrial declaration
granted at the defendant's request because of prosecutorial misconduct. In Potter, there
was no mistrial declaration; rather, the trial court en banc had awarded a new trial
because it believed the trial judge had erred in refusing to grant Potter's mistrial motions
during his second trial. Ordinarily, when a conviction is set aside because of trial error, as
was Potter's conviction, the double jeopardy clause does not preclude reprosecution. See
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third conviction, he contended that misconduct by the prosecution at
his second trial should have foreclosed reprosecutiopi and thus a third
conviction.159 In raising the double jeopardy challenge, the defendant
relied upon Bolden and urged the court to constrke the term overreaching as embracing not only deliberate prosecutorial misconduct,
but also recklessness or gross negligence." The court, speaking
through Justice Pomeroy, analyzed the various interests implicated by
the double jeopardy prohibition and concluded that the standard urged
by the defendant was unwarranted.'
The Potter court recognized that in Bolden it had defined the term
prosecutorialoverreaching as embracing not only intentional misconduct but also gross negligence." 2 But the court noted that the opinion
in Bolden represented the views of only Justices Roberts and
Manderino,'I and the court further maintained that the decisions in
Beasley'" and Kessler,lu upon which the Bolden court relied, used
gross negligence standards in dictum and were therefore "frail reeds
upon which to posit such a holding."'" The court also characterized the
7
as highly suspect;
subsequent court of appeals decision in Martin'1
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 622 (1896). But the Potter court agreed that the distinction
between granting a new trial at the defendant's request and ordering a mistrial at his request is without significance for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. The court thus
determined that it should apply the same standard that would be applied in deciding
whether or not retrial should be barred if a mistrial declaration had been granted at the
defendant's request. Were the permissibility of reprosecution to be governed by a more
relaxed standard where a trial verdict is set aside post-trial, the court stated, trial judges
might be led to reject the most meritorious mistrial motion and instead require the trial
to proceed to its conclusion despite a legitimate claim of serious prejudicial error.
159. 478 Pa. at 256, 386 A.2d at 920. Prior to the commencement of his third trial,
Potter filed a motion to dismiss the case and to be discharged on double jeopardy
grounds. The motion was denied and no appeal was taken from the order of denial at that
time. Although a majority of the court in Bolden had agreed that an order denying a motion to dismiss pre-trial on double jeopardy grounds is immediately appealable, the court
did not construe Potter's failure to appeal as a waiver of his double jeopardy claim since
Potter filed his appeal a substantial period of time prior to the Bolden decision. See note
151 supr.
160. 478 Pa. at 262, 386 A.2d at 923.
161. Id at 258-62, 386 A.2d at 921-23. See notes 17 & 28 supr
162. Id. at 262, 386 A.2d at 923. See text accompanying notes 144-49 supr
163. 478 Pa. at 262 n.5, 386 A.2d at 923 n.5.
164. United States v. Beasley, 479 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924, reh.
denied, 414 U.S. 1052 (1973). See text accompanying notes 105-07 suprL
165. United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976). See text accompanying
notes 108-14 supra.
166. 478 Pa. at 262-63 & n.5, 386 A.2d at 923 & n.5.
167. United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1977). See text accompanying
notes 115-25 supra
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since Dinitz' " required a showing of conduct "undertaken to harass or
prejudice the defendant," ' Justice Pomeroy could not perceive how
the Martin court could equate grossly negligent conduct with conduct
which is undertaken with a particular end in view. Such conduct is not
negligent conduct, but rather intentional conduct.""0
In contrast to Justice Roberts' opinion in Bolden, the Potter court
concluded that the phrase "undertaken to harass or prejudice the
defendant" does not include the concept of grossly negligent conduct
simply because it fails to exclude that idea.' The public interest in
convicting those guilty of crimes was seen as too important an interest
to be subordinated to the concept of a prosecuting attorney's
negligence, even though it be labeled gross. Criminal defendants are
adequately protected, Justice Pomeroy maintained, by the sanction of
complete discharge which is imposed when the government's agent
acts with intent to abort the trial.72
Justice Roberts dissented,"'8 finding totally unpersuasive the reasons
advanced by Justice Pomeroy for requiring an intentional misconduct
standard."' Justice Roberts maintained not only that the interests embraced by the double jeopardy clause are inadequately protected by
such a standard, 7" but also that an intentional misconduct standard ignores the public interest in the prompt and proper resolution of
criminal litigation."" A gross negligence standard, Justice Roberts
alleged, promotes the public's interest in ensuring that its resources
are utilized most effectively without the burdens of delays and
mistrials.1 7 Finally, Justice Roberts noted that criminal defendants
should not be forced to bear the heavy burdens incident to reprosecu168.

United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976). See text accompanying notes 81-90

supra.

169. 424 U.S. at 611.
170. 478 Pa. at 263-64, 386 A.2d at 923-24.
171. Id.at 265, 386 A.2d at 925.
172. 1& at 267, 386 A.2d at 925.
173. Former Chief Justice Jones did not participate in the decision in Potter. Only
Chief Justice Eagen and Justice O'Brien joined in the opinion of Justice Pomeroy. Justices
Roberts and Manderino dissented separately from the court's evaluation of Potter's double
jeopardy challenge. Justice Nix agreed with Justice Pomeroy's double jeopardy analysis,
but voted to reverse the judgment of sentence and award a new trial on other grounds.
Therefore, since the court was equally divided, the judgment of sentence imposed
by the lower court was affirmed.
174. 478 Pa. at 277, 386 A.2d at 931 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
175. 1I at 282-83, 386 A.2d at 933-34.
176. 1i at 277 & 283-84, 386 A.2d at 931 & 934.
177. Id.
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tion because of prosecutorial misconduct so conspicuously below pro-

fessional standards. 78
Justice Manderino also dissented from the reasoning employed by
the majority regarding the double jeopardy issue. He acknowledged
the difficulty or precisely defining such terms as gross negligence, but
nevertheless believed it to be clear that the prosecutor's acts in Potter
were so unreasonable, were done with such manifest disregard of the
defendant's rights to a fair trial, and were so removed from the conduct deemed proper of a prosecutor that they should be treated as if
intended to cause a mistrial. 79
VI.

CONCLUSION

In theory, the general rule that permits a second prosecution when
the first proceeding has been terminated at the request of the defendant seems sound, for the defendant has voluntarily decided to relinquish his right to proceed before the first jury and instead has chosen
to withstand the expense and anxiety associated with a second trial.
The general rule is also consistent with the principle that permits a second prosecution when a conviction is overturned on appeal because of
prejudicial error at the trial level."
Often, however, prosecutorial misconduct will be the activity that
prompts an affirmative defense motion for mistrial so as to avoid the
risk that a conviction will follow primarily because of the taint of prejudicial error. 8' In such instances, merely focusing on who moved for
the mistrial is an inadequate resolution to the problem of whether a second prosecution should be permitted.'82 The defendant may technically
retain the right to choose between continuing with the tainted proceeding or subjecting himself to the burdens of a second trial, but the
defendant's preference for a mistrial is clearly not a voluntary one if
178. Id. at 285, 386 A.2d at 935.
179. Id. at 298, 386 A.2d at 941 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
180. See United States v Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (double jeopardy clause presents no
obstacle to retrial if conviction is set aside by the trial judge or reversed on appeal).
181. Deciding whether to request a mistrial in such circumstances clearly presents a
most difficult problem for the defendant, since the value of a verdict by the first tribunal
is obviously extremely important to the defendant. See United States v. Tateo, 337 U.S.
463, 474 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (many juries acquit defendants after trials in
which reversible error has been committed, and many experienced lawyers will forego a
motion for mistrial in favor of having the case decided by the first jury).
182. See Retrial After Mistrial, supra note 15, at 1278 ("it is difficult to believe that
the substantive rights of criminal defendants may be determined by which attorney first
gains the attention of the trial judge to move for mistrial").
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the government was responsible for initially creating the dilemma.'" It
would seemingly be inconsistent with the administration of justice in
the United States to conclude that an accused must barter away his
constitutional protection against the oppression of multiple prosecutions in order to avoid the hazards of continuing a proceeding tainted
with prejudicial error. 8 '
By construing overreaching to embrace any intentional or grossly
negligent misconduct by the government, the decisions in Kessler,85
87
Martin,'" and Bolden"
represent a justifiable attempt at resolving the
dilemma confronted by the defendant who must otherwise endure the
ramifications of the misconduct or waive his right to plead double
jeopardy. Clearly, the Kessler, Martin, and Bolden decisions are intended to provide greater protection for criminal defendants in this
area. The standard applied in those decisions eases the nearly insurmountable burden previously confronted by defendants who were required to demonstrate that the prosecutor deliberately caused the
mistrial in order to avoid an acquittal or secure another opportunity to
convict the accused under more favorable circumstances. But this standard also recognizes that simple negligence should not bar reprosecution because it would place upon the prosecutor an unreasonable
burden to conduct flawless trials and would create the undesirable
result of permitting criminal defendants to go free because of minor error. Thus, the intentional or grossly negligent misconduct standard
seems to maintain a desirable equilibrium between the competing interests at stake: it protects the defendant's right to a fair trial free
from prejudicial error without unduly subordinating the public interest
in convicting those guilty of crimes.
This standard does, however, possess certain inherent shortcomings.
First, any inquiry into the mental state of the prosecutor is, of course,
a difficult one,"' and the precise point at which an impropriety
becomes gross negligence is difficult to isolate. Moreover, such a standard might have the anomalous effect of leading trial judges to
cautiously reject possible meritorious mistrial requests and instead
permit the trial to proceed to its logical conclusion despite a legitimate
183.
184.
(1966).
185.
186.
187.
188.

See generally Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 533.
See Commonwealth ex rel. Montgomery v. Myers, 422 Pa. 180, 220 A.2d 859
See
See
See
See

text accompanying notes 108-14 supra.
notes 115-25 and accompanying text supra.
text accompanying notes 144-49 supra.
Mistrial and Double Jeopardy, supra note 56, at 951.
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claim of prejudicial error. In other words, rather than recognize the
defendant's mistrial request and create the possibility that a second
prosecution will be barred, trial judges might ignore such requests and
thereby force the defendant to endure a second prosecution if and
when the error is corrected on appeal."' This result would thus impose
upon the defendant the precise burden and expense against which the
double jeopardy clause is supposed to provide protection."
Despite these apparent shortcomings, however, the intentional or
grossly negligent misconduct standard has the positive effect of placing the burden of suffering the ramifications of serious governmental
impropriety upon the party responsible for the misconduct. Also, a
possible solution to the potential problem of trial judges rejecting
meritorious mistrial requests has been suggested by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. In Commonwealth v. Potter,"' the court concluded
that when the defendant's mistrial request is ignored but his conviction is subsequently set aside on a post-trial motion because of trial error, the permissibility of reprosecutiori should be governed by the
same standard that is applied when a mistrial declaration has been
granted at the defendant's request because of improper prosecutorial
conduct.1 " This approach thus helps to eliminate the possibility that
the intentional or grossly negligent misconduct standard might reduce
rather than increase the protection afforded to criminal defendants;
misconduct of this type will preclude a second prosecution regardless
of whether the defendant's mistrial request is granted or ignored.
Most importantly, however, such a standard will at least encourage
prosecutorial competence, and deter the prosecutor from abusing his
authoritative power. The prosecutor, as a public official, does not play
a purely adversary role and should be deterred as much as possible
from abusing his authority by introducing injustices into the adjudicatory process.9 ' It is as much his duty to refrain from engaging in
improper conduct that might produce a wrongful conviction as it is to
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.'U Additionally,
the prosecutor has a duty as a public official to safeguard the public's

189. See United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135, 142 (8th Cir. 1977) (Henley, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Dinitz, 492 F.2d 53, 63 (5th Cir. 1974) (Bell, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 424 U.S. 600 (1976)).
190. See Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 535.
191. 478 Pa. 251, 386 A.2d 918 (1978) (per curiam).
192. I& at 256-60, 386 A.2d at 920-22. See note 158 supr.
193. See Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1756 (1969).
194. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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interest in seeing that its resources are utilized most effectively and
without the burdens of delays and mistrials."
When a defendant's mistrial motion is based upon error by the prosecution, the difficult conflict between the public's interest in convicting
those guilty of crimes and the defendant's rights to a fair trial free
from the taint of prejudicial error and to be safeguarded against the
oppression of multiple prosecutions is most clearly brought into focus.
Somerville and Dinitz reflect the general willingness of the Burger
Court to permit reprosecution after a mistrial declaration and apparent heightened solicitude for the public's interest in convicting the
criminally accused. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a present majority
of the Court would find prosecutorial overreaching absent a clear
showing of bad faith intent designed to provoke a mistrial request. But
such a standard seems to unreasonably restrict the constitutional
rights of the accused, and fails to adequately place constraints on prosecutorial misconduct. A broadening of the concept of overreaching to
embrace any intentional or grossly negligent transgressions by the
prosecutor would seem properly to take into account the competing interests at stake.
Lawrence J. Baldasare
195. See Commonwealth v. Potter, 478 Pa. 251, 283-84, 386 A.2d 918, 934 (1978) (per
curiam) (Roberts, J., dissenting).

